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NOTES
THE POWER OF THE SENATE TO UNSF-T AN OFFICER

V HOSE

APPOINTMIENT IT HAS CONFIRMED AND NOTIFIED THE PRESIDENT
THEREOF-President Hoover made appointments of certain men to

office as members of the Federal Power Commission. These appointments were confirmed by the United States Senate and three of the
appointees were inducted into office. These three members notified
some of the clerical staff of the old Power Commission, of which
they were members, that their services would be temporarily retained
by the new Power Commission. Three members of that staff, however, did not receive such notices, with the result that the Senate
requested the President to return the approved credentials of these
three appointees to membership on the Federal Power Commission,
which the President refused to do on the ground that the attempt to
reconsider these appointments after the Senate had consented thereto,
had notified the President thereof, and the men had taken the oath of
office was an unconstitutional invasion of the executive power of
removal. Thereupon, the Senate returned the names of the three
officers to its appropriate committee, the Committee reported without
recommendation the names of the men, and the Senate thereupon
again confirmed two of the men but refused to confirm the third one.
The Senate also adopted a resolution for the employment of counsel
to work either in conjunction with, or independently of, the United
States Attorney for the District of Columbia in bringing quo warranto proceedings against this officer of the Federal Power Commission to test in the courts his right to hold office.'
This note is not concerned with either the right or the political
expediency of the action taken by this quorum of the Federal Power
Commission in giving notice to some of the employees of the old
Power Commission, which had been superseded by the law creating
the new Power Commission, that they would be temporarily retained
on the public payroll pending consideration of the desirability of their
permanent appointment and failing to give such notice to three other
employees. In other words, the writer does not desire to enter into
the merits of that controversy and this note deals only with the single
question of the constitutional power of the Senate to unseat by recon'For the essential Senate history of this case see letter of President refusing
to return the nominations, 74 CONG. REC. 1887 (193) ; and for statement to the
public of his reasons for refusing to do so, ibid. 1962. For opinion of AttorneyGeneral advising the President that Senate had no constitutional power to require
return of the nominations, ibid. 2992. Debate, etc., on return of the names to the
Senate Executive Calendar, ibid. 1887-1893. For institution of quo warranto
proceedings, see Senate Resolution 415. For resolution to bring qtw warrnto
proceedings against one member who was not reconfirmed, ibid. 4036; 65 U. S. L.
Rev. 121, 126 (1931).
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sideration the appointment of an officer of the United States which
into office.
it has confirmed and which officer has been inducted
It must be admitted since the Myers case,2 that Congress may
not constitutionally limit the President's power of removal of executive officers of the United States. I use the words "executive officers" advisedly, for. as stated by James M. Beck, who represented the
United States in the Mvers case:
"That decision does not decide whether or not there may
not be a class of officers who are not in strictness executive officers. For example. the Federal Trade Commission is chiefly
a fact-finding commission, to aid Congress in formulating legislation. The Interstate Commerce Commission is a fact-finding
commission which discharges the so-called legislative duty of
imposing reasonable rates upon carriers. The Comptroller General is regarded as the special representative of Congress in seeing
that its appropriations are faithfully disbursed.
"Can the President remove such quasi-legislative officials?
This decision is not conclusive upon this point and properly so;
for no case of this character was before the Court." I
Whether the members of the Federal Power Commission be
viewed as strictly executive officers or, to use Mr. Beck's
phrase, quasi-legislative officers, the statute creating their office did
not attempt to place any restriction on the President's power to
remove them. 4 The constitutional question concerning the right to
remove them is brought into the case through the claim on the part
of the Senate that it has the authority to reconsider the vote by which
it agreed to the appoinments and then to refuse to confirm the appointments. The validity of this claim is the single issue discussed
in this note.
The Constitution provides that "each House may determine the
rules of its proceedings " and with respect to nominations and
notices of confirmations the Senate has adopted rules as follows:
"WNhen a nomination is confirmed or rejected any Senator

voting in the majority may move for a reconsideration on the
same day on which the vote was taken, or on either of the next
two days of actual executive session of the Senate; but if a
notification of the confirmation or rejection of a nomination
shall have been sent to the President before the expiration of the
time within which a motion to reconsider may be made, the
Mvyers v. United States, 272 U. S. 52, 47 Sup. Ct. 21 (1926).
3 New York Times, Nov. 7, 1926, at 15.
'Act June 23, 1930, 46 STAT. 797, 798 (193o), 16 U. S. C. A. §792 (Supp.
1930).
Article I, § 5.
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motion to reconsider shall be accompanied by a motion to request the President to return such notification to the Senate.
Any motion to reconsider the vote on a nomination may be laid
on the table without prejudice to the nomination, and shall be a
final disposition of such motion.
"Nominations confirmed or rejected by the Senate shall
not be returned by the Secretary to the President until the expiration of the time limited for making a motion to reconsider
the same or while a motion to reconsider is pending unless otherwise ordered by the Senate." 6
When the Senate confirmed the appointments to the Federal
Power Commission the President was officially notified thereof before the expiration of the period within which the Senate couldunder its rules--entertain a motion to reconsider the vote consenting
to the nominations and three of the appointees qualified by taking
the oath of office and entering upon the performance of their duties.
The motion to reconsider was made in the Senate before the expiration of the next two days of actual executive session and was properly
accompanied by a motion to request the President to return the
notifications to the Senate-all in accordance with its rules.It must be admitted at the outset that there are no judicial precedents exactly in point for it seems that in all our history no question
involving this question has reached the courts as to the authority
of the Senate to confirm the nomination of a person to an office and
then to reconsider the vote and refuse to consent to the nomination
after the individual had been appointed and qualified during the
interval between the confirming vote with official notice to the
President thereof and the motion to reconsider the vote. Neither
is any light thrown on the question by the proceedings of the Constitutional Convention of 1787.
A case having some bearing on the question is that of United
States v. Le Baron.8 In that case one Beers was nominated in April,
185o, by the President to the Senate as deputy postmaster at Mobile.
The nomination was confirmed by the Senate and the commission
had been made out but not transmitted to Beers on the date when
the surety bond sued upon was given. It was contended on behalf of
the surety that the bond was ineffective in that Beers was not legally
a deputy postmaster when the bond was given. Said the court:
"When a person has been nominated to an office by the
President, confirmed by the Senate, and his commission has been
signed by the President, and the seal of the United States affixed
Rule XXXVIII, Standing Rules of the Senate.

-Attorney General 'Mitchell's opinion of January Io,1931, 74 Co.--G. REc.
.93().
4041 8 19 How.
73 (U. S. 1856).
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thereto, his appointment to that office is complete.

Congress

may provide, as it has done in this case, that certain acts shall
be done by the appointee before he shall enter on the possession
of the office under the appointment. These acts then become
conditions precedent to the complete investiture of the office;
but they are to be performed by the appointee, not by the executive; all that the executive can do to invest the person with his
office has been completed when the commission has been signed
and sealed; and when the person has performed the required
conditions his title to enter on the possession of the office is also
complete."
Of course, this case is not exactly in point for the reason that
no motion to reconsider the confirming vote was entered in the case
of Beers, but can it reasonably be argued that such a motion entered
in accordance with the rules of the Senate after the President has
signed the commission, delivered it to the appointee, and the appointee
has performed the only condition precedent-the taking of the oath
of office-to complete title to the office must operate to change the
rule ?
The argument for the affirmative of this question was summarized in the Senate as follows:
"It seems to me that an analysis of the situation would lead
to this conclusion: It is the affirmative vote of the Senate, in
its finality, which gives validity to a confirmation. A notification
to the President is merely evidence of the action taken by the
Senate. If the notification goes forward within the 2-day period,
it simply serves to notify the President that the Senate has
voted affirmatively. But always it is conditioned upon the power
of the Senate to reconsider within the prescribed time, namely,
two days of actual executive session. If this notice went forward, in the meantime, it being merely evidence of the action
taken by the Senate, it was accompanied with the condition that
the Senate reserved unto itself the vested power to reconsider
within the prescribed period.
"It seems to me the notification to the President is of like
consequence in this situation, it merely being evidence of the
vote taken by the Senate and that vote being subject to the right
of the Senate to reconsider." 0
This argument cannot be reconciled with the above quotations
from the opinion in the Le Baron case. Furthermore, the same court
has held that when a bill has passed both Houses of Congress, has
been signed by the presiding officers thereof, and has been signed by
974 CO-NG. RE:c. 1479 (93).
See also ibid. 1480, where a reference was
made to THROOP, PUBLIC OFFIc=aS (1892) § 89, but it seems that this section has
no bearing on the question at issue.
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the President, such bill has become a law which cannot be changed
except as provided in the Constitution.'
It seems logical to argue
that when the Senate has confirmed a nomination made by the President, the President has issued the commission, and the appointee
has performed such acts as are necessary to invest himself with
the office, the title thereto is complete and that the officeholder cannot
be removed therefrom except as provided in the Constitution. The
attempt of the Senate to do so under the guise of reconsidering its
vote within two actual days of executive session as provided in its
rules is not a method so provided in the Constitution. True, the
Senate power to make rules is provided in the Constitution, but this
does not mean that such rules as the Senate may make are constitutional. It seems that the same principles of interpretation must be
applied to Senate rules with respect to their constitutionality as have
been applied by the courts in testing the constitutionality of a statute
enacted by Congress. If any rule of the Senate cannot meet such a
test, it must be held in excess of the powers of the Senate and if the
quo warranto proceedings authorized and directed by the Senate are
pressed to test the right of the confirmed and rejected member of
the Power Commission to the office in question, we shall probably
learn that this particular rule of the Senate cannot be upheld in its
attempted application.
0. R. 31cGuire.
Washington, D. C.

EQUITABLE CONVERSION BY CONTRACT FOR SALE OF REALTYAPPLICATION IN TAXATION

CASES-Recent decisions I indicate a con-

tinuing uncertainty as to the nature of equitable conversion by contract of sale.as a ground for rendering the vendor's interest subject
to a transfer tax. This situation, in view of the now more or less
well-settled rule in the case of equitable conversion by will, - would
seem to justify a re-examination of the cases to discover the reasons

'Field v. Clark, 143 U. S. 649,

12

Sup. Ct. 495 (1892).

'For example: It re Wolcott's Estate, 94 Misc. 73, 157 N. Y. Supp. 268
(ii96) ; In re Russell's Estate, ii9 Misc. 12,1 94 N. Y. Supp. 837 (1922) ; Paul's
Estate, 14 Pa. D. & C. 251 (i93o), affd, Pennsylvania Supreme Court, -March,
1931 (Fraser, C. J., and Maxey, J., dissenting).
2Frick v. Pennsylvania, 268 U. S. 473, 45 Sup. Ct. 603 (1925) ; In re Hogg's
Estate, 284 Pa. 1, 13o At. 24o (1925) ; In. re Robinson's Estate, 285 Pa. 3o8,
132 Atl. 127 (ig26). Contra: Land Title & T. Co. v. South Carolina Tax
Comm.,

131 S. C. 192, i--26 S. E.

I89 (1925).

Note

(1912)

61 U. OF PA. L.

Rav. io9; (1925) 73 U. OF PA. L. Rav. 439. Decisions in such cases, while
persuasive as to the general theory of conversion, are of course not controlling
in the situation considered by this note. In theory, conversion by will does not
occur until the death of the decedent, while the so-called conversion by contract
dates from the execution of the contract (before the death of the party whose
estate it is sought to tax).
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for or against the application of the doctrine under such circumstances.
The concept of "equitable conversion" seems to have been introduced into the common law by Lord Eldon. In the case of Seaton v.
Slade he expressed it in the form which has now received common
acceptation:
"The effect of a contract for purchase is very different at
law and in equity. At law, the estate remains the estate of the
vendor, and the money, that of the vendee. It is not so here.
The estate from the sealing of the contract is the real property of
the vendee.".
That this was not a mere accidental statement is shown by the
case of Paine v. Meller,4 decided the previous year, which indicates
that Lord Eldon realized the implications of his statement and was
willing to regard equitable conversion as a principle general in scope,5
and not a mere description of the result in the case he was then considering (z, burden of loss due to fire).
Earlier cases, while recognizing an alteration in the rights of the
parties to the contract of sale for certain purposes from the time
of the execution of the contract, do not go to the extent of supporting
Lord Eldon's generalization.' Since Scaton v. Slade literally hundreds
of cases fixing the respective rights of the vendor 7 and vendee s

U7 Ves. Jr. 268, 274 (1802) (specific performance decreed against the
vendor).
'6 Ves. Jr. 349 (ISO9).
""'... if the party to the contract has become in equity the owner of the
premises they are his to all intents and purposes. They are vendible as his,
chargeable as his, capable of being encumbered as his; they may be devised as
his; they may be assets; and they would descend to his heirs." Ibid. at 352.
(Italics the writer's.)
'Vendee may compel specific performance if contract is a proper one for
such performance. Bubb's Case, Freem. Ch. 41 (1678) ; Baden v. Pembroke, 2
Vern. Ch. 213 (169o). As between executor and heirs-at-law of vendor, purchase money passes to executor, but heirs are bound to convey legal title of land
to vendee. Bubb's Case, supra; Mayer v. Gowland, Dick. 563 (779) ; Smith v.
Hibbard, 2 Dick. 731 (1789). If contract is specifically enforcible, vendee's
interest is realty and passes to heir-at-law rather than to executor. Davie v.
Beadsham, I Ch. Cas. 39 (1663); Greenhill v. Greenhill, Prec. Ch. 320 (1711) '
Milner v. Mills, Mos. 123 (1729) ; Alleyn v. Allevn. Mos. 262 (1730) ; Langford
v. Pitt, 2 P. \Vms. 629 (1731) ; Potter v. Potter, I Ves. Sr. 437 (175o). But if
not specifically enforcible, then money laid out for purchase passes to executor.
Green v. Smith, I Atk. 572 (1738). Vendor has equitable lien for purchase
price. Pollexien v. Moore, 3 Atk. 272 (1745). Husband of vendee entitled to
curtesy in money to be laid out in land under executory contract of sale.
Sweetapple v. Bindon 2 Vern. Ch. 536 (1705).
-Vendor's interest is personalty and passes to personal representative.
Brown v. Ide, lO9 Conn. 307, 147 AtI. 4 (19-29) ; Griffith v. Stewart, 31 App.
D. C. 29 (i9o8), aff'd. 217 U. S. 323, 30 Sup. Ct. 528 (191o) ; Rhodes v. Meredith, 26o I1. 138, io2 N. E. 1o63 (1913) ; Persico v. Guernsey, 129 Misc. 190,
220 N. Y. Supp. 689 (1927) ; In re Denning's Estate, 112 Ore. 621, 229 Pac. 912
(1924) ; Helsel's Estate, 2-5

Pa. 612 (1917)

; 3 POMEROY, EQUITY JURISPRU-

NO TES

under a contract of sale 0 have found their way into the reports,
and whether modern courts have been impressed by the aptness and
exactness of the term or have merely been dazzled by its rhetorical
brilliance and inclusiveness, it is nevertheless true that in practically
every case they have been content to rest the result reached upon the
principle of "equitable conversion" rather than attempting, as did
the early cases, to seek out some specific ground in equity or in law
for granting or refusing the relief sought. 10 It is significant, however, that a search of the reports since 1802 reveals no case'" where
DE.CE (4th ed. r918) § 1164; 2 STORY, EQUITY JURIsPRUDENCE (I4th ed. 1918)
§ 1o92. Land will not pass under vendor's later devise of land or of real estate.
Elliott v. Fisher, 12 Sim. 505 (1842). Contra: Klock v. Buell, 56 Barb. 398
(N. Y. 1868). Some decisions hold that if agreement of sale is purely executory
and in no way binds vendee to complete purchase, interest of vendor remains
unchanged and at death passes to heirs as realty. Sheeby v. Scott i28 Iowa 351,
104 N. W. 1139 (i9o5); Vendor may not give a valid deed or mortgage of
property to one having knowledge of vendee's equities though he may assign his
interest under the contract. Ellis v. Jeans, 7 Cal. 4o9 (1857) ; Bailey v. Alleghany National Bank, 1O4 Pa. 425 (1883) ; Rose v. Watson, IO H. L. Cas. 672
(164).
Land not subject as land to lien of judgment against the vendor.
Pasquay v. Pasquay, 235 ill. 48, 85 N. E. 316 (I9o8) ; Stockfleth v. Britten, 1o5
N. J. Eq. 3, 146 Aft. 583 (1929).
' Vendee's interest is considered realty and passes to heirs rather than to
personal representative. Flomerfelt v. Siglin, 155 Ala. 633, 47 So. io6 (i9o8) ;
Bowen v. Lansing, 129 Mich. 117, 88 N. W. 384 (191o) ; Harney v. Donohoe,
97 Mo. 41, io S. 1".. 191 (i888) ; In re Edgewater Road in City of New York,
r38 App. Div. -03, 122 N. Y. Supp. 931 (igIO), aff'd, ig N. Y. 56o, 93 N. E.
112o (igio) ; In re Kelleher's Estate, 133 Misc. 581, 232 N. Y. Supp. 68o (1929).
Vendee must bear fire loss even thcugh not in possession. Marks v. Tichenor,
85 Ky. 536, 4 S. W. -5 (1887) ; Dunn v. Yakish, io Okla. 388, 6t Pac. 926
(i9oo) ; Morgan v. Scott, 26 Pa. 51 (r856) : and any insurance on the property
is regarded as for his benefit. Phinizy v. Guernsey, 111 Ga. 346. 36 S. E. 796
(19oo) ; State Mutual Fire Insurance Co. v. Updegraff, 21 Pa. 513 (1853) ; 5
Po rtoy, op. cit. supra note 7, § 2283. Contre: Raynor v. Preston, i Ch. D.
I (1881) (but with strong dissent by James, L. J.). Vendee may execute valid
mortgage of property subject to rights of vendor who holds the legal title as
security for payment of purchase money. Flomerfelt v. Siglin, ibid; Bowen v.
Lansing, ibid. Surplus from foreclosure sale made after mcrtgagor's death is
treated as realty. Dunning v. Ocean National Bank, 61 N. Y. 497 (1875) ; and
mortgagor's widow is entitled to dower even though she was a party to the
mortgage. Kitchens v. Jones, 87 Ark. 502, 113 S. V. 29 (r9o8). The title is
subject to the lien of a judgment against him in jurisdictions where an equitable
interest may be so charged. Rand v. Garner, 75 Iowa 311, 39 N. W. 515 (I888) ;
but even where this is not permitted. vendee's interest may be charged and property sold to satisfy the judgment. Doe ex. dein. Cooper v. Cutshall, Smith 128
(Ind. 1848). Vendee may maintain partition. Longwell v. Bentley, 23 Pa. 99
(1854) ; Vendee, if in possession. may maintain trespass q. c. f. even against
vendor. Smith v. Price, 42 Ill. 399 (1866).
Vendor is liable as trustee for
deterioration of the property. Clark v. Ramsey (1891) L. R. 2 Q. B. 456.
In addition, of course, there is the right of specific performance in the
vendee, and (under certain circumstances) in the vendor, and the ordinary
action at law, by either party for damages for breach of contract.
"See, for example: Semmler v. Beulah Coal Mfining Co., 48 N. D. io11,
I88 N. W. 310 (1922); In re Denning's Estate; In re Helsel's Estate, both
supra note 7.
" Excepting, of course, certain of the taxation cases, hereinafter discussed.
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the court's decision (as distinguished from the court's language) has
extended 12 the application of the alleged conversion to a situation
in which the same result would not have been obtained prior to that
time, but explained on other grounds without reference to a "conversion."'13

But although courts have, practically without exception, accepted the doctrine of equitable conversion as a "reason," there has
been equal unanimity in their insistence that not in all cases of a
contract of sale does a "conversion" occur. It must be a contract
that equity will specifically enforce; 1' and if that be improper
because of defects in the vendor's title,15 the statute of frauds, 6 or
17
the existence of any other bar to a decree of specific performance,
no conversion takes place.Is A contract of sale, then, does not "convert" the property, nor is it strictly true, as a recent decision suggests,19 that "the powers of a court of equity are invoked to do
this." Mlore accurately, the vendee, by reason of the form and terms
of the contract and the situation of the parties, has certain remedies,
legal and equitable, against the vendor in the event of breach. Normally he may claim specific performance, but if the contract does
not admit of this or any other equitable remedy he must be content
with an action at law. Likewise the vendor has such legal or equitable
rights under the contract as its terms and the surrounding circumstances confer.
V\here the vendee's (or vendor's) interest under the contract
is in dispute between his heirs-at-law and his personal representative
'Except by a process of simple logical deduction from general principles
already well established at that time.
"Compare the results in the modern cases, supra notes 7 and 8, with cases
decided before the time of Lord Eldon, supra note 6. A contrary view is indicated by PoMxOY, SPECIFIC PERFORMANCE OF COxTRACTs (3d ed. 1926) § 314.
"... The vendee is looked upon and treated as the owner of the land; an
equitable estate has vested in him commensurate with that provided for by the
contract. Although the vendor remains owner of the legal title, he holds it as
a trustee for the vendee to whom all beneficial interest has passed. The consequences of this doctrine are all followed out." If this language be interpreted
as supporting Lord Eldon's generalization, it is not supported by the cases that

the author cites. Such an interpretation of this language, however, is rendered

doubtful by the same author's language elsewhere. See, for example, Po.MzoY,
op. cit. supra note 7, §§ 1161, I166.
" Rodisch v. Moore, 266 III. io6, 1O7 N. E. lo8 (1914) ; In re Bernhard's
Estate, 134 Iowa 6o3, 112 N. \,V. 86 (1907) ; Ingraham v. Chandler, 179 Iowa

3o4, I61 N. W. 434 (1917) ; Keep v. Miller, 42 N. J.Eq. ioo, 6 Atl. 495 (i886).
'Mackey v. Bowles, 98 Ga. 731, 25 S. E. 834 (1896) ; In re Thomas, 34
Ch. D. 166 (1886).
1"

Mills v. Harris, 1O4 N. C. 626, 10 S. E. 704 (18990).

'Wittingham v. Lighthipe and Traphagen, 46 N. J.Eq. 429, i9Atd. 611
(189o) ; Kerr v. Day, 14 Pa. 112 (185o).
"SIt should be observed that these are bars as between the vendor and the
vendee.
'

Paul's Estate, sunpra note I.

NOTES

the courts are called upon to determine the preferable mode of distribution of the decedent's rights. A regard for strict legal symmetry would counsel a distribution based upon the existence or nonexistence of the right of specific performance in the given case,20
and this is in fact the prevailing view.2 ' This result, however, is
predicated not on any theory of conversion,22 but upon what the court
deems the fairest rule of distribution in view of the outstanding rights,
legal and equitable between the parties to the contract. There are,
moreover, cases,2 3 where a quite different rule of distribution is
adopted, without regard to the existence of a right to specific performance. Cases involving the doctrine in deciding questions of
dower and curtesy are similarly explainable.
24
It has been pointed out, however, by justice (then Dean) Stone,
25
Dean Pound, and others 2 that the use of the descriptive appellation
"equitable conversion" as applied with respect to the rights of parties
to the contract as between each other or between those in privity
with either,2 T is, although historically unsound and as a practical matter inexact and confusing, usually harmless, and its application rarely
makes any difference in result. Where, however, a third person is
attempting to invoke the doctrine the exact meaning of the term is
no longer inconsequential, and hence its use must be either adopted or
rejected.
This problem is presented in perhaps its clearest form where a
state seeks to subject a decedent vendor's or vendee's interest under
the contract to the application of a state transfer tax-it being well
settled that real property, as such, is taxable only at its situs.28
Where the decedent is vendor under an executory contract for the
sale of foreign realty, is his interest in the property still realty, hence
non-taxable except at the situs of the property, or does the doctrine
'For a decree of specific performance against the vendor to be effective,
the heir-at-law must be decreed to convey the legal title to the land, whereas the
purchase price as personalty goes to the administrator. The term "equitable
conversion" is, roughly, expressive of this result. But where no right to specific
performance is involved, it is said that no conversion occurs. Manifestly, this is
because the vendor has merely a right to the purchase money which, clearly, is
personalty, hence passes to the administrator.
' Supra notes 7 and 8.
Supra note 6; Stone, infra note 24, at 377; Pound, infra note 25, 832;
Ames, Equitable Conversion (igo6) I9 HARv. L. REV. 233.
'Note appended to Keep v. Millcr, 42 N. J. Eq. IOO (1886).
"Stone, Equitable Conversion by Contract (1913) 13 COL L. REv. 369, 375.
Pound, Progress of the Law, 1918-1919 (1920) 33 HARV. L. REv. 813, 832.
See, for example: Ames, Equitable Conversion (i9O5) 18 HAv. L. REV.
z45; Foulke, Equitable Conversion. in Pennsylvania (1910) 58 U. OF PA. L. REV.
455, 463-4.
7 (1. e., heirs, personal representatives, wife claiming dower, husband claiming curtesy, etc.)
2, 2 COOLEY, LAw OF TAXATION (4th ed. 1924) § 447; GEASON AND OTIS,
INHERITANCE TAXATION (4th ed. 1925) 545.
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of equitable conversion operate to render the vendor's interest personalty, hence subject to a tax at his domicile?
Equitable converson-A "status" or a "description"
The fundamental question. of course, is (i) whether the property
at the time of the decedent's death had lost its original status 29
(even though the contract was merely executory) and assumed a
new status 30 (that which the contract, upon its performance would
have brought about), or (2) whether the status of the property (to
all intents and purposes) remained the same as before the contract
was executed, and the term "equitable conversion" is merely descriptive of the effect of specific performance of the contract, if a court
of equity should later deem the case a proper one for such a decree,
and if, as, and when a party capable of asking specific performance
should in fact seek it.

Probably the best statement of the former view is to be found
in the decision of the New York court in In re Boshart's Estate: "From the moment of the execution of the contract the
property rights and interests of the parties and those claiming
under them are fixed and determined by the equity rule whenever the same come in question, and on the death of the party
the same rule determines whether his interest under the contract
is real or personal, and therefore, to whom it shall pass, and
there seems to be no reason why the same rule should not be
applied in determining whether the transfer of the property is
subject to a transfer tax."
Since the only question at issue in such a case is "how is the
interest of the decedent fixed and determined," the court's argument

is obviously a petitio principii. Modern scholars agree, -2 moreover,

as has already been pointed out, that the rule of distribution is capable
of a different explanation from that which the court is disposed to
make of it. This and similar decisions 3 state the theory of a
"changed status," but do not clarify or explain its basis. As previously observed, the history of the doctrine does not support this
theory, 4 and though the New York court sees no reason why equitable
' It is the status of the property at the time of decedent's death that determines whether or not it is taxable. In re Swift's Estate, 137 N. Y. 77, 32 N. E.
1o96 (1893) ; In re Sutton's Estate. 3 App. Div. 208, 38 N. Y. Supp. 277 (I896),
aff'd 149 N. Y. 618, 44 N. E. i 128 (I896).
' In accordance with the maxim, "equity regards as done that which ought
to be done."
lo7 Misc. 697, 177 N. Y. Supp. 567 (i19), aff'd, 188 App. Div. 788, i77
N. Y. Supp. 574 (i919).
Supra notes 24 and 25.
Infra notes 36, 39, and 43.
Supra note 6.
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conversion "should not apply" as a universal rule, there seems to be
a paucity of reasons, in theory, why it should be considered as anything more than a description of results in those cases, involving
merely the adjustment of the equitable rights of parties and those in
privity with them, to which courts of equity had hitherto confined
its application.3 5 The reported cases thus far deciding the precise
question are apparently in hopeless conflict. An examination of
the facts involved therein, however, throws interesting light on the
practical operation of the doctrine in tax cases, and incidentally upon
the true nature of the vendor's and vendee's interests under the
contract.
Nature of the Vendor's interest
There are three situations in which the problem as to the vendor's
interest may arise: (i) Where the state is attempting to tax a
resident vendor's interest in foreign property, in which event the
application of the doctrine would render the vendor's interest taxable
as intangible personalty.
Such a result was, in fact, reached in the recent case of Stat, e.v
rel. Hilton v. Probate Court of Ramsey County," where a Minnesota
vendor's interest in a contract for the sale of Montana land was held
subject to a Minnesota transfer tax.
(2) Where the taxing state seeks to tax a non-resident vendor's
interest in property located within the state. Here the doctrine, if
:T
applied, would exempt this interest from being taxed as realty. ;
This result has been rejected in Michigan,:s where the court has held
Supra notes 6, 7, and 8.

See BlsPHA.N.t,

PRINCIPLES OF

EQUITY (9th ed.

i9r5) § 307. "By equitable conversion is meant a change of property from real

into personal, or from personal into real, not actually taking place, but presumed
to exist only by construction or intendment of equity. 'Nothing', it has been
said, 'is better established that this principle, that money directed to be employed
in the purchase of land, and land directed to be sold and turned into money, are
to be considered as that species of property into which they are directed to be
converted; and this in whatever manner the direction is given, whether by will,
by way of contract, marriage articles, settlement, or otherwise; and whether the
money is actually deposited, or covenanted to be paid, whether the land is actually
conveyed, or only agreed to be conveyed.' By this and similar declarations th2
judges do not mean to assert a solemn piece of legal jugglery without any
foundation of common sense; but simply to lay down the practical doctrine that
for certain purposes of devolution and transfer, and in order that the rights of
parties may be enforced and preserved, it is sometimes necessary to regard property as subject to the rules applicable to it in its changed and not in its original
state and although the change may not have actually taken place." (Italics the
writer's.)
145 Minn. 155, T76 N. W. 493 (19-20).
= Though it is possible that the law of the state may be such as to tax intangible personalty elsewhere than at the domicile of the creditor. 2 COOLEY, ,p.
cit. sapranote 29, § 455; GOODRICH, CONFLICr OF LAWS (1927) Io8.
The case of
Stanton's Estate, 142 Mich. 491, 1o N. W. 1122 (1905).
Dodge County v. Burns, 89 Neb. 922-, 171 N. W. 922 (1911) is often cited as
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the tax applicable on the theory that the vendor's interest was realty.
There is language in the opinion of the Pennsylvania Supreme Court
in Arbuckle's Estate " which supports the contrary view, but that
language is no part of the actual decision in that case.
(3) Finally, where both the domicile of the vendor and the situs
of the property are within the taxing state-here the vendor's interest
should be taxable as personalty, not as realty. No decisions involving this situation are available though the reason for the scarcity
of such cases is obvious.4"
New York Cases show a peculiarly benevolent attitude towards
the estate of deceased vendors. In In re Baker's Estate 41 and In re
Wolcott's Estate4 2 equitable conversion was held to be a mere descriptive term or "fiction," and the courts refused to invoke it to
render a resident vendor's interest in foreign realty taxable in New
York. However, under the converse situation, where the application
of the doctrine would exempt a non-resident vendor's interest in a
contract for the sale of New York land from the New York transfer
tax, the courts have in two cases '3 approved such action by giving
supporting the "status" theory under this situation. There, a New York vendor
entered a contract for the sale of Nebraska land. -Nebraska sought to tax his
interest in the contract and the court denied the right to tax. "But", said the
court, "we have not discovered any of these contracts or a copy thereof in the
bill of exceptions; nor is the substance of any of them stated in or proved by the
evidence. Counsel for the respective litigants, however, agree that we should
consider the subject in dispute as though the contracts were real estate mortgages, and we therefore confine the discussion to that point of view." The
court then proceeds to decide that the taxable situs of a mortgage is the domicile

of the mortgagee. Though this case would have tested the "status" theory had
all the facts been before the court, it is apparent from the portion of the opinion
quoted that the case was decided on a quite different theory.
SP252 Pa. 16i, 165, 97 Atl. 186, 187 (1916) : "If, instead of testamentary
direction by the (non-resident) decedent, that his said real estate in the city of
Pittsburgh should be sold, he had entered into a written contract for the sale of
it, his interest in it would have ceased to be realty from the time he executed the
contract and would have become a chose in action. .

.

. The State of Penn-

sylvania would have no claim for collateral inheritance tax upon the proceeds of
the land, for it had been converted into personalty by the act of the deceased
non-resident and the situs of it, as of all his personalty . . . would be his
domicile."
. For such a decision to arise in the situation here referred to, there would
have to be a distinction in the tax statute between the rate of tax on transfers
of realty and transfers of personalty (or some similar distinction). There are
cases, however, where the court invokes the doctrine (during vendor's lifetime)
for the purpose of ordinary taxation, thus taxing the vendor on the realty, as
holder of the legal title, and also on his chose in action under the executory contract. See, for example: Perrine v. Jacobs, 64 Iowa 79, 39 N. W. 861 (0884) ;
State v. Rand, 39 'Minn. 502, 40 N. W. 835 (i888). Contra: Branner v.
Thomas, 37 Kan. 282, 15 Pac. 211 (1887).
" 67 Misc. 36o, 124 N. Y. Supp. 827 (i9io).
494 Misc. 73, 157 N. Y. Supp. 268 (1916) (immaterial that proceeds of
contract of sale go to administrator rather than to heirs).
'2In re Boshart's Estate, supra note 31 ; In re Russell's Estate, supra note I.

NOTES

"equitable conversion" the full rank of a "status." 44 All of these
New York decisions were in lower court cases. The matter,
apparently. has not as yet been considered by the Court of Appeals.
The situation in Pennsylvania is now apparently settled. A
recent lower court decision 4 held that the doctrine of equitable
conversion has no application in tax cases (under the first vendor
situation), being a mere fiction of equity applied (and even then
inaccurately) in actions between the parties or those in privity with
them. This decision has just been affirmed by the Supreme Court
of Pennsylvania. Despite the language in the case of Arbuckle's
Estate 4 the conclusion now seems inescapable that the doctrine would
likewise be rejected in the second vendor situation.
If any conclusion is to be drawn from such a conflicting mass
of decisions it is that there is no unanimity of opinion among courts
as to the compelling necessity of adopting the "status" theory of
equitable conversion in tax cases. But if there is this indifference
as to the necessity of applying it in the case of the vendor's interest,
there is more than indifference-there is a decided aversion-to
applying it to the interest of the vendee.
Nature of the Vendee's interest
If the true nature of the vendor's interest in the executory
contract of sale from and after the execution of the contract can be
said to be "personalty," then, a fortiori the interest of the vendee
from the same moment becomes "realty." All of the analogies which
the proponents of the status theory seize upon to support their theory
of an actual change in the nature of the vendee's interest apply with
equal force here. As many general statements are to be found to the
effect that the vendee's interest becomes "'realty," as to the effect that
the vendor's interest becomes "personalty." In each case the same
rules apply as to distribution (as between the heir-at-law and the
47
administrator), dower, curtesy, and burden of loss by fire, etc.

The conclusion seems inescapable, therefore, that if the status of
the vendor's interest is changed sufficiently by the contract to warrant
the assessment of a transfer tax thereon, then a corresponding change
is wrought in the vendee's interest for the same purpose.
Thus, if the doctrine be applied here it would follow: (i) that
a non-resident vendee's interest under a contract for the purchase of
land within the state would be taxable, and (2) that a resident yendee's interest in a contract for purchase of land outside the state
would be exempt from taxation. One searches the reports in vain,
"This action is all the more significant in view of the fact that New York
holds that intangible personalty is taxable only at the domicile of the owner.
Paul's Estate, supra iote I.
Supra note 39.
47Supra notes 7 and 8.

782

UNIVERSITY OF PENNSYLVANIA LAW REVIEW

however, for cases where such application of the doctrine has been
made. Accustomed as courts are to dealing with legal fictions (such
as mobilia sequintur personamn, etc.), especially with reference to
the taxation of intangibles, it is not surprising that the incongruity of
treating the vendor's interest as personalty should escape their notice.
Where, however, thevendee's estate has a definite sum of money within
the state which would normally be taxable, and the doctrine of equitable conversion is advanced as a compelling reason why this money
is in fact "realty" outside the state and hence non-taxable, courts
see little or no force behind this contention. No decision has been
found where the "status" theory has been applied in either of these
vendee situations, and in at least one case 3 rejecting this theory the
second vendee situation is treated as the reductio ad absurdum of
equitable conversion as a basis for taxation.
In conclusion, it is submitted that the "change in status" theory
of equitable conversion is supportable neither by the history of the
doctrine nor in theory-all instances of its application (other than
certain tax cases herein discussed) being explainable (and with even
greater accuracy) by elementary principles of equity or law, without
reference to a conversion. It is further submitted that as a theory
of taxation it is incapable of complete absorption into our existing
system. Then, as a practical matter, there are alreadv sufficient
necessary artificialities involved in the taxation of realty, and of
tangible and intangible personalty, without introducing this additional wholly artificial basis-a basis which complicates the whole
system without either extending or narrowing the extent of a state's
taxing power except in a purely accidental way. Of the court"
which sees no reason why the "change in status ' theory should not
be applied in tax cases, the legal pragmatist may be permitted to
inquire: (i) What compelling legal reason is there for such an
application? and (2) What useful purpose would be served thereby?
K. W. B.
MARSHALING OF SECURITIEs-EFFECT OF SUBSEQUENT IINCUMTO MARSHAL-It is a just principle of
equity jurisprudence which dictates that a paramount incumbrancer
having two funds to satisfy his demands shall not, by his election,
disappoint a junior incumbrancer, who has only one of those funds
at his disposal.' Should the former resort to the doubly charged
BPANCES ON THE "RIGHT"

* In re Baker's Estate, supra note 41.
4'In re Boshart's state. supra note 31.
Cheesebrough v. 'Millard. i Johns. Ch. 409, 412 (815) ; Lanoy v. Athol, 2
Atk. 444, 446 (1742) ; Aldrich v. Cooper, 8 Ves. 381, 388 (1803) ; BIsPHA.M!,
PRINCIPLES OF EQUITY (9th ed. 1915) §340; 2 STORY, EQUITY JURISPRUDENCZ
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fund, the latter will be subrogated to the rights of the former in
respect to the singly charged fund.2 This doctrine is but an application of the maxim, sic utere tao ut non alienunt laedas, and since
it is an equity that exists between creditors of the same debtor, it is
necessarily directed against the debtor himself. 3 A court of equity
cannot, in justice, sit idly by and allow one fund to be exhausted,
to the prejudice of a junior creditor, and to the benefit of the debtor.
Little difficulty is encountered in marshaling the securities when, for
example, a mortgagor and two mortgagees are involved, but the cases
are in utter conflict when a situation of the following sort is presented: 4 0 mortgages properties No. i and No. 2 to A; then 0
mortgages No. i to B, and, finally, No. 2 to C. A forecloses and
sells both properties, the funds being paid into court. A is paid in
full, but the residue is insufficient to pay both B and C in full. B
insists upon being subrogated to A's lien against No. 2, but C objects,
and the court is then called upon to distribute the proceeds of the
foreclosure sale equitably.5
(14th ed. 1918) § 853. Chief Justice Gibson, in Ramsay's Appeal, 2 Watts 22S,
(Pa., I834), states the proposition in characteristic fashion: "But if there is

232

any rule of principle of equity plainly, positively and incontrovertibly established
on the basis of reason and authority, it is that he who may at law control the
application of two or more funds, shall not be suffered to use his legal advantages
in a way to exclude the demand of a fellow creditor, whose legal recourse is but
to one of them. It is one of the most benign influences of equitable jurisdiction,
that it adjusts the application of jarring liens according to their priority and
value, in such a way as to produce a degree of satisfaction to all commensurate
with their rights; than which there can be no purer justice." For a discussion
of the origin and development of the doctrine, see 2 STORY, op. cit. su pra § 856.
As is pointed out in BISPHAM, op. cit. supra note 1, § 341, this is the usual

method by which relief is obtained. The paramount incumbrancer ought not, in
justice, to be compelled to go after one or the other fund. He was diligent
enough to obtain sufficient security, and he ought not be hampered in any manner. Mr. Pomeroy says on this subject: "This form of relief (injunctive) is
not, in my opinion, warranted by the principle; . . . and it seems to interfere
with the prior vested rights of creditor No. 1," 4 Po.Fraov, EQUITY JURISPRUDENCa (3d ed. i9o5) § 1414, n. 6.
' "This is an equity against the debtor himself, that the accidental resort of
the paramount creditor to the fund doubly incumbered, shall not enable him to
get back the other fund discharged of both debts. . . . This right (to marshal)
it was not in the power of the mortgagor to defeat by confessing judgments to
other creditors, or by contracting subsequent debts," per Strong, J., in Delaware
& Hudson Canal Company's Appeal, 61 Pa. 512, 516 (i86r).

' It is rather generally stated that marshaling will not be allowed to the

prejudice of a third party's rights, and the situation described in the text is an
illustration of what the authorities mean. See 4 PO.MEROY, 1oc. cit. supra note 2;
2 Story, op. cit. supra.note I, § 87o. The use of such a phrase might prove
misleading. The problem in marshaling cases of this type is one of balancing
equities. Does the equity to marshal outweigh the equity of subsequent mortgagees or purchasers for value? Does the fact that the latter advanced their
money with knowledge of the prior incumbrances affect the situation? An equity
to marshal will not displace a legal right, so it means very little to say that marshaling cannot be had to the prejudice of the rights of third parties. The very

question is, Do they have those rights?

'The designation of the various parties in the text is for the sake of con-

venience, and is used throughout the note.
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The source of much of the English law on marshaling of securities is Lord Eldon's opinion in Aldrich v. Cooper. Lord Eldon was
very careful to state that the general doctrine of marshaling is
applicable "if no third persons are concerned," - and in the later
case of Barnes z. Racser,8 Vice-Chancellor Bruce, relying on Aldrich
v. Cooper and on certain dicta in Averall v. [Fade, decided that A,
in the case stated above, must be paid ratably out of No. I and No. 2,
and that B and C stood in pari passu, even though C took his mortgage
with full knowledge of all prior incumbrances.1 0 The law as developed by this case, and by the later case of Bugden v. Bign old,11 has
remained the law of England ever since,12 despite some doubts as to
its logic expressed in Wellesley v. Lord Mornington.13 This dis0

Supra note i.
'S Ves. at 391. The inference is that if third persons are concerned, there
can be no marshaling to their prejudice.
I Y. & C. C. C. 401 (1842).

r Llo d & G. temp. Sugden 252 (1835). In that case, Sir Edward Sugden
referred to Aldrich v. Cooper at length. He stated the general principle of
marshaling, and then continued: "This is a narrow doctrine, and cannot generally
be enforced against an incumbrancer, who is a mortgagee," at 255.
'Barnes v. Racster differed slightly on its facts from the case stated in the
text. At the time B obtained his mortgage, A only had a mortgage on No. I,
but later the mortgagor gave A No. 2 as further security. This fact does not
alter the result, as the only question is, Did B ever have an equity to marshal?
The court in this leading English case left the question open (see infra note ii),
but certainly at the time A got his double security, B could have marshaled
securities, so that the "accidental nature" of B's acquisition of his equity should
not cause any difficulty. The court in Barnes v. Racster laid some "tress on this
aspect of the case.
n"2 Y. & C. C. C. 377 (1843). This case raised exactly the problem stated in
the text, and in addition C took his security without notice. With Barnes v.
Racster as a precedent, this court had no trouble at all in reaching their conclusion, and one reviewer, writing in I LAw TI.mEs 397 (843), said the court should
have even gone one step further, and paid C alone Gut of the proceeds of No. 2.
The court in this case treated B as not having looked to property No. 2 for any
benefit, and that, therefore, he should not be disappointed in not getting complete
relief by throwing A exclusively on No. 2.
' See Wellesley v. Lord Mornington, 17 W. R. 355 (1869) ; Flint v. Howard,
[I893] 2 Ch. 54; Baglioni v. Cavalli, 83 L. T. 5oo (19oo). But see Tighe v.
Dolphin, I I. R. 305 (i9o5), in which there was a judgment on certain land, and

the judgment debtor settled a portion of the lands in consideration of a forthcoming marriage. Then followed a sale of the remainder of the land. "The
defendants were subsequent purchasers of the unsettled lands, and cannot disturb
the equity which arose by reason of the marriage settlement," at 31o.
Supra note 12, at 356: "So far as positive decision goes, it has been decided
entirely the other way in Barnes v. Racster; that decision has never been appealed from, but followed in subsequent cases and largely acted upon. . . .
There is a great deal to be said in favor of an argument which went to a great
extent upon this,-that the person taking the third mortgage must take it subject
to all the interest to which the mortgagor himself would be subject." But the
court continues: "I cannot say, therefore, on principle that the case of Barnes v.
Racster is wrong. It may be that the reasoning on it is not stated very logically, .

.

. (but) the whole of our law with reference to that subject will not

bear very much the test of logical sequence. When you find a case concurred in
so long as Barnes v. Racster, it would be very strange to overrule it. If ever
we are to overrule it, it must be on very strong grounds."

NOTES

position of the problem seems to be more in harmony with the basic
nature of marshaling, and it is perhaps attributable to the absence
of a recording system at the time the law crystallized. This fact
kept the English courts from dealing with the question of presumed
notice, but when one of the facts in the case is that C took his mortgage with notice in fact of the prior incumbrances, there is little to
4
be found in support of a result like Barnes v,. Racster.Y
The decided cases in this country are in conflict. Many jurisdictions adopt the English view,'- while equally as many courts, following a dictum of Chancellor Kent in Clowes v. Dickenson,"' have
reached a contrary result, and have practically accorded the equity to
marshal the effect of a lien." The latter group of courts consistently
deal with the question of notice,' s Pennsylvania. for example, presuming that C took his security with notice of the prior incumbrances
and their legal effect.19 All courts are apparently in accord on one
" It should be noted that the English decisions leave the door open to the
practice of fraud on the part of A, the debtor. There is nothing to stop him
from giving C, a friend, a mortgage on the second property, reducing to that
extent the amount that B would otherwise get. Of course, if a court of equity
even suspects the presence of fraud in the case, B and C will not be treated
equally, but the possibility is still present, and it may be for this reason that a
number of American jurisdictions have reached an opposite result.
'Leib v. Stribling, 51 Md. 285 (1878); Bates v. Boston El. R. Co., 187
Mass. 328, 72 N. E. 1017 (9o5) ; Green v. Ramage, iS Ohio 428 (1849) ; Gilliam
v McCormick, 85 Tenn. 597, 4 S. W. 521 (1886) (the leading American case
supporting this view, containing a well-reasoned opinion). See Richards v.
Cowles, 105 Iowa 734, 75 N. X. 648 (i898) ; Newby v. Fox, go Kan. 317, 133
Pac. 89o (9Q3).
" 5 Johns. Ch. 235 (X. Y. 1821). Speaking of the status of successive purchasers from a judgment debtor, the Chancellor says: "In this respect, we may
say of him, as is said of the heir, he sits in the seat of his grantor,and must take
the land with all its equitable burdens; it cannot be in the power of the debtor,
by assigning or selling his remaining land, to throw the burden of the judgment,
or a ratable part of it, back upon A."
'Bank of Commerce of Evansville v. First Nat'l Bank, i5o Ind. 588, 50
N. E. 566 (1898) ; Hunt v. Townsend, 4 Sandf. Ch. 543 (N. Y. 1847) ; Robeson's
Appeal, I17 Pa. 628, 12 At. 5I (1888) ; Bank of Orangeburg v. Kohn, 52 S. C.
i2o, -9 S. E. 625 (1897) ; Conrad v. Harrison, 3 Leigh 532 (Va. 1832). It is
said that the result reached by these courts gives marshaling the effect of a lien
for the reason that it takes precedence over the rights of a bona fide mortgagee
or purchaser for value.
' See infra notes 19 and 28.
" See Robeson's Appeal, spra note 17, at 635, 12 Atd. at 56: "The appellees,
in the absence of proof to the contrary, will be presumed to have taken their
mortgage with full knowledge of all the facts disclosed by the record, and would
thus be affected with notice of all the equities, which, owing to the peculiar condition of the respective liens the appellants had as against the Woods judgments."
Cf. this passage from Green v. Ramage, supra note i. at 429: "We think the
rule cannot be applied in a case of this kind. The principle is one established for
the purpose of securing to parties the rights to which under the principles of
natural justice, they are entitled. . . . When Green (B) took his mortgage,
he had notice of the mortgage of Wilson (A), on lot No. 14 (No. i). When
Hillier (C) took his mortgage on lot 39 (No. 2), he had notice only of the liens
of Wilson (A), which was all the incumbrance on it. There was nothing connected with Wilson's lien that was even calculated to put him on inquiry in
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situation, namely, where C is a judgment creditor or a volunteer. Both
the American and the English courts then say that C's rights can
his equity against
rise no higher than A's, and since B could enforce
0
A, he can avail himself of its benefits against C.2
From this brief survey of authority it is evident that a correct
solution to the problem can only be obtained by a true understanding
of the nature of marshaling. The courts perfunctorily call marshaling
an equity, without considering its weight and effect. Marshaling is
essentially and fundamentally an attempt so to apply "jarring liens"
as to cause the least amount of friction. The courts do not refer
to this equity as a fixed, indisplaceable right, and yet many American
courts must treat it as such, if they accord to one claiming under the
equity priority over a bona fide purchaser for value without actual
notice of the existing situation. Of course, the courts say that
there is notice, in law, but as will be pointed out later this seems
an unwarranted presumption. When marshaling is considered from
a strictly equitable viewpoint, the English view seems to be the better
one. The court should marshal as of the time the interested parties
are in court asking for relief ; but it does not follow that the situation
that existed at the time the various liens were acquired should be
disregarded. The equity to marshal existed from the time the situation giving rise to the equity was created, and, therefore, when C,
in our hypothetical case, took his mortgage with notice of an incumbrance prior to his, and also with notice of B's mortgage, there
is no principle of justice which should protect him-he should be
treated as having taken subject to all the equities that arose from
the relation of those prior incumbrances. C cannot consistently say
that he is not chargeable with knowledge of the nature of the equity,
for he is now in court attempting to take advantage of that very
principle-to have A paid ratably out of No. i and No. 2.
Looked at in this light, the actual decision of Barnes v. Racster
seems wrong. but it does not follow that the later English cases are
also wrong, for in none of them did C have notice in fact of the
prior liens. 21 It is true that the criticism just indulged in is based on
reference to Wilson's mortgage on lot 14, because Wilson's liens on these two
lots were created by separate instruments. But if Wilson's liens on the two lots
had been created by a single mortgage, Hillier was not bound to notice the situation of lot 14, having nothing to do with it." Notice, apparently, plays an important part in the decision of the case, for the inference is that if there was no
notice in fact, a different result might be reached.
For a recent case touching on this question, see Riverside Apartment Corp. v.
Capitol Construction Co., 152 Atl. 763 (N. J. 1930), where the court says that C,
in that case, took with notice, although the case does not bring out that there
was notice in fact-I52 At. at 769.
'See Reynolds v. Tooker & Hait, 18 \Vend. 591 (N. Y. 1836); Ramsay's
Appeal, supra note i; Averall v. Wade, supra note 0.
21 E. g., Bugden v. Bignold. supra note II; Wellesley v. Lord Mornington,
snpra note 12. These courts approve Barnes v. Racster, and, therefore, inferentiallv indicate that they would decide a case of that sort in the same manner.

NOTES

the assumption that the equity to marshal is something real and fixed
before its aid is sought in court, but this seems true-the equity arose
the moment B took his mortgage. At this stage the equity was so
weak that the rights of a bona fide purchaser for value without notice
could displace it, but the equity should be sufficiently virile not to be
defeated by the rights of a subsequent taker with notice of its existence.
The Pennsylvania decisions have passed through an interesting
development. The situation in the earlier cases was one where C
was a judgment creditor, and the courts uniformly held that the
judgment creditor must suffer. For example, in Hasting's Case,"
A had judgments which were liens on two pieces of property, while
B had a mortgage lien on but one of them. B was permitted to throw
A on the other property first, despite the protests of C, a still later
This result was reached in all cases -1 until
judgment creditor.2
Hoff's Appeal,2 5 in which C was a purchaser for value, and the court
refused to allow B to marshal to C's prejudice. This case was distinguished in Robeson's Appeal 26 on the ground that C, in this case, was
a mortgagee and not a purchaser.2 7 It is submitted that this distinction is a specious one; a mortgagee in this situation should be entitled to the rights of a purchaser for value. The true distinction
lies in this-the court in Robeson's Appeal went on a theory of
presumption of notice, while the court in Hoff's Appeal treated the
purchaser as having taken bona fide without notice. Robeson's
Appeal is, in fact, an overruling of Hoff's Appeal. A happier solution
might have been found in putting the burden of proving notice on
the person attempting to secure the benefits of the equity to marshal. 2 s
H. N. S.
io Watts 303 (Pa. i84O).

The court used rather broad language: "This equity, it must be observed,
existed on the part of Humes (B) before Alexander (C) acquired his lien on
the property as a security for the payment of his debt; . . . Alexander must
be considered as having taken or obtained his judgment and lien subject to the
prior equity of Humes; qui prior est in ternpore, potior est in jure", IOWatts
at 305.
'See Dunn v. Olney, 14 Pa. St. 219 (185o) ; Delaware & Hudson Canal
Company's Appeal, supra note 3.
"84 Pa. 42 (1877). Says the court: "It is clear, therefore, that Hoff (B)
has no equity which he can work out, except by displacing a bona fide purchaser,
who is prior in time (?), superior in claim on Phillips, the common debtor, and
who must lose all his money in case he is displaced."
" Supra note 17.

"It will be observed that Reiff (C) was a purchaser, not a mortgagee, and

Phillips, under the implied covenant in his deed, was bound to make the title good
to him; he was a bona fide purchaser for full consideration wholly paid, without
notice in fact of the lien of the judgment," 117 Pa. at 635, 22 AtI. at 56. The
quotation from this case referred to supra note ig on the notice point seems to
cover a purchaser as well as a mortgagee.

'The court, in effect, is imposing upon C a duty of running back every
chain of title connected with a blanket mortgage, to ascertain whether any latent
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DISPLACEMIENT OF PRIOR LIENS BY RECEIVER'S CERTIFICATES
ISSUED TO PRESERVE THE PROPERTY OF A PRIVATE CORPORATION BY
CONTINUING ITS BUSINESS-Two conflicting legal interests have con-

tributed to the confusion in the law of receiver's certificates issued
as paramount liens upon property in the receiver's hands, at every
stage in the development I of this comparatively modern extension
of equity jurisdiction.2 The application of the rule that it is the
duty of a court of equity to preserve property coming into its hands
for the greatest ultimate benefit of all parties concerned, and hence
to borrow money on prior lien certificates in order to accomplish this
end,3 has been opposed and checked by the general policy of our law,
founded upon constitutional declarations,4 to render the highest
possible protection to obligations of contract.' It is not to be inferred, however, that direct rulings on the constitutional question have
equities exist. To impose such a duty is contrary to the spirit of our Recording
Acts, the policy of which is to remove secret liens. To charge C with notice is
to give B a secret lien on a property, the existence of which lien is not discernible from the title to that property.
The question of notice is so thoroughly gone into by most of the American
cases because of the presence of recording systems. The notice problem is the
important one to be considered, but to presume notice is probably going too
far. Prospective purchasers or mortgagees of real estate are rightly consid-

ered to be on notice of prior liens on the property concerned, but the equity to
marshal is one that can only be uncovered after, what may be in some cases, a
most exhaustive and unreasonable search.

I "It is only against railroad mortgagees that the Supreme Court of the
United States has sustained orders giving priority to receiver's certificates . . "
Farmer's Loan & T. Co. v. Grape Creek Coal Co., 5o Fed. 481, 482 (S.D. Ill.
1892) ; "It is the exception, and not the rule, that priority of liens can be displaced," Hooper v. Trust Co., 81 Md. 559, 592, 32 At. 5o5, 514 (1895) (if this
power is extended beyond railroad liens, then no mortgage liens will be secure
from the court's action) ; Raht v. Attrill, lO6 N. Y. 423, 437 (0887) (rigid rather
than liberal construction of the court's powers to protect the integrity of contracts) ; Dalliba v. Riggs, n Idaho 364, 372, 82 Pac. 107, 1O9 (1905).
2 The first important case on the precise point of the present discussion involved a railroad corporation, Meyer v. Johnston, 53 Ala. 273 (1875) ; see Fid.
Ins. T. Co. v. Roanoke Iron Co., 68 Fed. 623, 624 (W. D. Va. 1895).
'Union Trust Co. v. Ill. Midland R. Co., 117 U. S.434, 455, 6 Sup. Ct. 8o9,
82o (1886) ; Farmer's Loan & T. Co. v. Grape Creek Coal Co., intpra. note I,at
481 ; see Sav. Bank v. Ball-Bearing Chain Co., 118 Iowa 698, 703, 92 N. W. 712
713 (9o2).

' "The rights of the citizen, lawfully acquired by contract, are under the
protection of the constitution of the United States and, like the absolute rights
of the citizen, are not dependent for their existence or continuance upon the discretion of any court whatever," Hanna v. Trust Co., 70 Fed. 2, 8 (C. C. A. 8th,
1895) ; see Lockport Felt Co. v. United Paper Co., 74 N. J Eq. 686, 690, 70 Adt.

98o, 98, (1908).

"We emphasize this fact of the sacredness of contract liens, for the reason
that there seems to be growing an idea, that the chancellor, in the exercise of his
equitable powers, has unlimited discretion in this matter of displacement of vested
liens," Kneeland v. American Loan Co., 136
U. note
S. 89,
I..08,10 Sup. Ct. 950, 953
(389o) ; see Hooper v. Central Trust Co., supra
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arisen to impede this growth in the power of the chancellor through
the receiver in his capacity of court's official representative. Rather
is the argument of unconstitutionality employed as an additional factor
going to make up the general policy against displacing vested contract liens. 6 It is stated as a general rule that the receiver's broad
discretion does not include the power to issue such certificates without
the authority of the court,7 and holders thereof take them subject to
the final ruling of the court.' As opposed to this, it has also been
held that "all equities in favor of the certificates should be liberally
construed".0 Although this necessary authorization is said to rest
entirely within the discretion of the court o,,.

.,

undoubtedly a

power to be exercised with great caution; and, if possible, with the
consent of all the parties interested in the fund" 11-the courts have
universally recognized that this power to displace vested liens is
limited by the necessities of preservation. 1 - Of course, if there is
a showing of consent or estoppel such that the vested lienholders
'See cases supra notes 4 and 5.
Sav. Bank v. Ball-Bearing Chain Co., supra note 3.
'"They [certificate holders] had at least constructive notice of Freeman's
mortgage lien, and are chargeable with knowledge that he was not a party to the
suit; that any certificates issued by the receiver were subject to his rights, and
that by final action of the court the validity or security of the certificates might
be prejudicially affected," Crump v. First National Bank, 229 Ky. 526, 534, 17
S. W. (2d) 436, 439 (1929); Union Trust Co. v. Ill. Midland R. Co., subra,
note 3.
Generally, it may be said that the authority of the receiver to issue certificates is fixed by the terms of the order of his appointment, Sav. Bank v. BallBearing Chain Co., supra note 3, and if the decree authorizing issuance does not
in terms disclose whether the certificates shall be a prior lien, the decree is construed in connection with the prayer, Karn v. Rorer Iron Co., 86 Va. 754, ii
S. E. 431 (i89o) ; see I CLIARK o-, RECEI ERS (2d ed. 1929) §§ 460, 462.
M11ontgomery Coal Corp. v. Allais, 223 Ky. 107, 3 S. W. (2d) i8o (i928);
cf. Crump v. First National Bank, supra note 8.
" It has been said that equity courts have the power in every case to authorize the issuance of certificates, but the propriety of such issuance is a matter of
discretion, 2 TARDY'S SM1ITH ox RECEIVERS (2d ed. i92o) § 541. However,
"such power is not an arbitrary, capricious one, but can be resorted to only in
the exercise of sound judicial discretion . . ," Van Valkenburgh v. Ford, 207
S. V. 405, 412 (Tex. i918) ; cf. Hanna v. State Trust Co., supra note 4.
'Bradley, J., in Wallace v. Loomis, 97 U. S. 146, 163 (877); Lockport
Felt Co. v. United Paper Co., srpra.note 4; Karn v. Rorer Iron Co., supra note
8. As to the necessity for notice to all parties, see I CLARK, op. cit. supra note
9, § 477; 2 TARaY's SMITH, op. cit. szpra note io, § 563.
"However, courts of equity have no jurisdiction to issue certificates which
shall be a lien on lands in another state, and it is necessary to apply for and
obtain a separate order in each of the jurisdictions in which property of the corporation lies, Lockport Felt Co. v. United Paper Co., supra note 4.
But it has been held that the fact that the certificates become a lien on land
in one jurisdiction does not prevent the use of the money obtained on such certificates to protect property out of the jurisdiction, if such use tends to protect
the property on which the lien has attached, Title Insurance and T. Co. v. Calif.
Development Co., 171 Cal. 227, 152 Pac. 542 I915).
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cannot be heard to object to the displacement of their priorities,Is
the chancellor's power to authorize the issuance of the certificates
cannot be questioned. The scope of this article does not permit consideration of the varying degrees of estoppel that may be found sufficient to justify the displacement of prior liens in different situations
where the loans are made for purposes more or less closely identifiable
with necesities of preservation. In passing, it must suffice to say that
the courts will not permit a secured creditor to stand by, where there
is a possibility that some benefit will accrue to him from an issuance
of paramount lien certificates, and then demand his priority if the
expected profit cannot be realized.
The overwhelming current of authority being in accord with the
rule that the receiver of a private corporation 1 may borrow money
upon certificates constituting a paramount lien upon the receivership
property only for the purposes of preserving that property, 5 nothing
would remain to be said upon the subject were it not for the lack
of criteria for determining what constitutes "preservation". 6 The
modern tendency of courts to become more and more responsive to
demands for the protection of economic interests has inspired an extraordinary growth in this jurisdiction of equity courts based upon the
necessities of preservation. Modern corporations have created demands for legal protection that could only be met by a newly formulated theory of procedure, peculiarly adapted to the needs of such
economic units. Especially has this distinction been recognized in
the case of receiverships of railroads, and quasi-public corporations.
How far has this line of reasoning been applied in extending the
jurisdiction of courts of equity in regard to private corporations
where it is desired that the business be continued while in the hands
of the receiver? As pointed out by the United States Supreme Court
in the case of Barton v. Barbour,7 two types of preservation, recognized either expressly or implicitly by the courts, must be distinguished; (i) preservation in the strict sense, or preservation of the
'Cox v. Snow, 47 Idaho 229, 273 Pac. 933 (1929) (good collection of
authorities) ; Raht v. Attrill, supra note I (no estoppel where trustee of bondholders is not a party nor has notice prior to the order for issuance) ; R. I.
Hospital Trust Co. v. Greene Corp., 15o AtI. 74 (R. I. i93o) (estoppel by failure
to appeal) ; Cement Co. v. Bass Foundry Co., 26 F. (2d) 348 (C. C. A. 6th,

5928).
" The right to issue receiver's certificates seems never to have been conceded
in the case of an individual, Fisher v. Southern L. & T. Co., 138 N. C. 90, 50
S. E. 592 (igo5).

" Contra: Hooper v. Trust Co., supra note I (receiver may act to preserve
the property, but not by means of prior lien certificates).
'As said by Andrews, J., in the leading case of Raht v. Attrill, .rpra note
I, "It would be difficult to define by a rule, applicable in every case, what are the
expenses of preservation which may be incurred by a receiver by authority of
the court," cf. Regent's Canal Iron Works Co., L. R. 3 Ch. Div. 41, 427 (5875):
Cox v. Snow, supra note 13, at 234, 273 Pac. at 935 ("the question of whether a
certain purpose is one of *preservation' or something else is purely relativc").
i104 U. S. 526, i35 (1881).
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property from physical destruction,"8 and (2) preservation of the
ceded purpose for which certificates may issue,' - discussion must
largely turn on consideration of the scope of the second classification
as developed in the decided cases-where the receiver has been authorized to do more than merely hold the property intact pending realization 21 or reorganization.' 2 Perforce of the language found throughout the cases, the very general statement must be made that whether
or not there is an absolute equitable power to displace preexisting
liens in order to obtain funds for the purpose of carrying on the
business, and thus preserve the property of the corporation at its
operating value, will usually depend upon whether the property in
the receiver's hands may be classified as that of a quasi-public or
private corporation. 2 '
Quasi-Public as Distinguishedfrom Private Corporations
Depending upon the exigencies of the particular case, it has
been recognized since the leading cases of Mlreycr v. Johnson ' and
Fosdick v. Schall,-" that receivers of public utilities may operate them
at the cost of the mortgagees' priorities.' 0 The question that naturally
arises as to what constitutes a quasi-public as distinguished from
a private corporation may best be explained by a consideration of
reasons given by the courts in support of the exercise of this extraordinary power in the case of the former. Fundamentally, the
inherent nature of railroad property demands for preservation pur'Farmer's Loan & Trust Co. v. Grape Creek Coal Co., supra note I; Hanna

v. State Trust Co., supra note 4; see I Clark, op. cit. supra note 9, § 463.

property in its existing condition as an economic unit in active operation. 9 Since preservation in the strict sense is the universally con"See Cox v. Snow, supra note 13, at 235, 273 Pac. at 935; I CLARK, ibid.
'But see Hooper v. Trust Co., supra note I.
I For the length of time included in "pending realization", see Farmer's
Loan & Trust Co., v. Grape Creek Coal Co., supra note I, at 481 ("protected
and preserved before sale") ; Dalliba v. Riggs, snpra note I; cf. Cox v. Snow,
supra note 13, at 238, 273 Pac. at 936 (receivership cannot be unduly prolonged,
but cases show period may be as long as four or five years) ; Raht v. Attrill,
supra note I, at 434; Boothe v. Summit Coal Co., 63 Wash. 63o, 116 Pac. -69
(1911) (hold and preserve property pending principal litigation).
-For a discussion of the receiver's certificates problem involved in this rapidly growing branch of the law, see Rodgers, Rights and Duties of the Conmn ittee in Bondholders' Reorgani.ation (i929) 42 HARv. L. REv. 899, 912.
IFarmer's Loan & T. Co. v. Grape Creek Coal Co., at 482; Raht v. Attrill,
at 436; both supra note I; Note (I9O9) 22 HArv. L. REv. 373.
"Si pra note 2.
es99 U. S. 235 (1878).
"'See I CLARK, op. cit. supra note 9,

§ 465; HIGH, RFCEIVERS (4th ed. 191o)
§ 398c et seq.; Wham, Preference in Railroad Receierships (1928) 23 ILL. L.
REV. 141 (full discussion and citation of authorities).
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poses that it be continued in active operation; 27 firstly, to eliminate
private loss by the prevention of (a) rapid decay incident to the
disuse of such property, and (b) reduction of the property to its
"junking" value on forfeiture for nonuser. Secondly, to satisfy the
public demand for the services of such public utilities.2
This fact
and the knowledge of lienholders that they acquire their bonds subject to displacement in favor of public service 21are sufficient answers
to constitutional objections. A third line of reasoning supports the
first and second on the ground that the state has an interest in continued operation derived from its contribution of the right of eminent
domain,30 and corporations which are denied this right cannot benefit
by the quasi-public corporations rule.
Through the lack of these factors, the scope of preservation
purposes is defined to exclude continuation of the business except
in the case of corporations such as railroads.31 Thus, a navigation
company was held to be outside the rule, because it lacked the right
of eminent domain. 32
'As said by Mr. Justice Blatchford in Union Trust Co. v. Ill. Midland R.
Co., supra note 3, "The character of the property gives character to the
particular species of preservation which it requires. Unimproved land may be
idle, with only payment of taxes. Improved property should be rented. Movable property that is not perishable may be locked up and kept; bui if perishable,

it must be sold, by way of preservation. A railroad, and its appurtenances, is a
peculiar species of property. Not only will its structures deteriorate and decay
and perish if not cared for and kept up, but its business and good will will pass
away if it is not run and kept in order. Ioreover, a railroad is a matter of
public concern. The franchises and rights of the corporation which constructed
it were not given merely for private gain to the corporators, but to furnish a
public highway; and all persons who deal with the corporation as creditors or
holders of its obligations, must necessarily be held to do so in the view, that, if
it falls into insolvency and its affairs come into a court of equity for adjustment,
involving the transfer of its franchises and property, by a sale, into other hands,

to have the purpose of its creation still carried out, the court, while in charge of
the property, has the power, and, under some circumstances, it may be its duty,
to make such repairs as are necessary to keep the road and its structures in a
safe and proper condition to serve the public. Its power to do this does not
depend on consent, nor on prior notice"; Fid. Ins. T. Co. v. Roanoke Iron Co.,
supra note 2, at 625.
Ibid.; Barton v. Barbour, supra note 17 ("But the public retain rights of
vast consequence in the road and its appendages, with which neither the company
nor any creditor or mortgagee can interfere").
See quotation of Blatchford, J., sitpra note 27.
3'
Bound v. South Carolina Ry. Co., 5o Fed. 312, 315 (D. S. C. 1892); Van
Valkenburgh v. Ford, supra note IO, at 415.
"Farmer's Loan & Trust Co. v. Grape Creek Coal Co., supra note I, at 482;
see I CLARK, op. cit. supra note 9, §§ 469(a), 470; HIGH, Op. cit. supra note 26,
§ 312b.
'Bound v. South Carolina Ry. Co., supra note 3o, at 315 (a merely "public
use is different from a public interest in the use") ; see Van Valkenburgh v
Ford, supra note Io, at 414 (public and private purposes, but private were domi-

nant).
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The Texas Supreme Court alone has questioned the sufficiency
of these distinctions, 3 but this tendency to depart from the general
rule seems to have been totally obliterated by the trend of the more
recent decisions by that court.3
It is also worthy of mention that,
in the case of a shipbuilding company, the Supreme Court of Pennsylvania upheld the issue of certificates as a primary charge upon the
general funds in the hands of the receiver.3 5 However, there is
direct authority more recently to the effect that the consent of the
prior lien creditors must be obtained before certificates issued by
the receiver of a private corporation will be valid." Thus, the universal rule is phrased without dissent throughout the cases that
only necessities of preserving the property of a private corporation
can justify the receiver in granting priority of security to his creditors.3 - But since, in some situations, "purposes of preservation"
are construed by the courts to include the continuation of the business
of a private corporation, the rule accomplishes little in the way of
furnishing a definite line of demarcation between preservative and
non-preservative purposes incident to such continuation. Whatever
rules may be found in solution of this problem must be discovered
"It is not clearly seen that the courts have the power to appropriate any
part of the property subject to a mortgage in the interest of the public, or to
impair the mortgagee's security or the obligation of their contract, in order to
discharge a duty the mortgagor owes to the public. But when the court has
taken control of property [whether of a quasi-public or private corporation]
and has placed it in the hands of a receiver, it is its duty so to direct its management as to preserve its value for the benefit of all parties at interest. This may
best be accomplished by continuation of the business, although such continued
operation may involve the danger of some loss," Ellis v. Water Co., 86 Tex. iog,
23 S. V. 8.58 (1893) ; cf. Lockport Felt Co. v. United Paper Co., supra note 4,
at 694, 7o Atl. at 983 (quotation infra note 37).
' Craver v. Greer, 107 Tex. 356, 179 S. W. 862 (915) ; Van Valkenburgh
v. Ford, supra note o.
'Appeal of Neafie, 9 Sadler 284, 12 Atl. 271 (i88i).
I Steel Co. v. Iron Works, 23 Pa. Dist. 828 (I914). But on the ground of
enhancing the security of the bondholders, the Supreme Court allowed certificates to constitute a lien prior to existing liens in the case of a railroad, Rutherford v. R. R. Co., 178 Pa. 38, 35 Ati. 926 (1896) (96% of bondholders consented).
'A popular and much-cited statement of the rule is that expressed in the
case of Lockport Felt Co. v. United Paper Co., szpra note 4, at 694, 7o Atl. 983,
"The rule which forbids the displacement of prior liens by receiver's certificates, at all events in the case of private corporations, is not the reasonable rule.
It goes too far. It may well be that one of the chief reasons for appealing to
the court to appoint a receiver is that the property may be protected from spoliation or destruction, and if, after the court shall have assumed to care for the
property, it finds that there is no income to support it, and that the court has no
authority to pledge the property for its own preservation or realization, the
original action in appointing the receiver would be futile. Under no circumstances would the court be justified in authorizing its receiver to borrow money
and make the obligation thereof a first lien on the property of a private corporation by the displacement of existing liens for the mere purpose of continuing the
business in which the company was engaged. unless possibly in the case in which
it satisfactorily appeared that the continuation of the business was absolutely
essential to the preservation of the property in the receiver's custody."
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only by careful analysis of the cases as a body of factual law. Very
little aid is obtainable from a study of the statutes on the subject
which are usually little more than codifications of the common law.3
Doubtless, the dearth of statutes authorizing the displacement of prior
liens without the consent of the vested lienholders may be traced to a
fear in the legislators as to the constitutionality of such legislation,
in view of the obvious impairment of the obligations of contract
involved. 39
The Scope of Preservation in the Case of Private Corporations
Due to the complexity and variety of factual situations in the
individual cases, clarity is furthered by reference to a typical case:
X, a private corporation, is insolvent. Y, a junior mortgagee or
creditor, whose claims cannot be realized presently, files a bill alleging the insolvency of X, praying for the appointment of a receiver
with authority to manage and continue the business and for an order
restraining all holders of liens prior to Y's from foreclosing the same.
to the end that the receiver may not be harassed in his conduct of
the business. "When a receiver is appointed under such a bill, he
usually makes haste . . . to assure the court, that if he only had

some capital to start on. he could greatly benefit the estate by carrying
on the business that bankrupted the corporation." " Since X is
insolvent, the funds for carrying on the business can only be obtained
by subverting the liens of prior mortgagees who alone object, being
the only parties who have nothing to gain by the court's venture into
business at their risk. When continuation of the business is allowed,
the outcome has been almost uniformly disastrous, with the result that
the case is brought to the court of appeals by the senior mortgagees
in an attempt to set aside the order authorizing the receiver to give
his creditors a paramount lien. The appellate court is then called
upon to determine the degree of security to which the holders of
certificates may be entitled. Of course, the certificates issued for
the necessary preservation of the physical structure of the property
will be allowed to take prior to the senior mortgagees, e. g., payments
of insurance premiums, 4' and for the services of a watchman. - CerSA statute providing that, "Courts of equity have full power, on good cause
shown, to dissolve or close up the business of any corporation, to appoint a
receiver therefor, who shall have authority by the name of the receiver of such
corporation (giving the name), to sue in all courts, and to do all things necessary
to close up its affairs as commanded by the decree of the court," was construed,
in Standlev v. Hendrie etc., Mfg. Co., 27 Co1. 331, 61 Pac. 6oo (i9oo), as
authorizing the issuance of first lien certificates only for necessary preservation
expenses.
' See II TARDY'S SMIHs, op. cit. supra note iO, § 554.
" Hanna v. State Trust Co., siepra note 4, at 7.
"Montgomery Coal Corp. v. Allais, supro note 9; Lockport Felt Co. v.
United Paper Co., supra note 4.
'Porch v. Agnew, 57 Atl. 546 (i9o4) (to prevent forfeiture of insurance
under terms of policy).
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tificates issued for the payment of taxes will also be allowed priority,
since this "is simply changing the form of the lien from one for
taxes for one for money borrowed to pay the taxes. 43 Ordinarily,
the courts hold that this enumeration completely outlines the scope
of preservation purposes. and certificates issued for other operating
expenses may not attain priorities to pre-existing liens. However,
there are some situations where the expenses incurred are not so definitely operating costs as to prevent their being judicially construed
as necessary for preservation.
A. As to Continuation to Prevent Forfeiture or Foreclosure
In a recent case, 44 the Federal District Court in the Southern
District of California upheld the issuance of certificates as prior liens
for the purpose of continuing the business of a land development
company in order to preserve its rights with the irrigation district.
Since the value of the property in the receiver's hands was more
than sufficient to satisfy all expenses of the receivership plus the
objecting lienholder's claim, after the payment of secured claims prior
thereto, the dissenting mortgagee could not be injured by the issuance,
while the benefit to be derived from continuance was obviously considerable. It seems that no practical objection can be offered against
such a holding confined to its facts, but the case represents an abnormal situation in this branch of receivership law whereas the normal
case involves insolvency. Thus where the facts varied to the extent
that the claims of the creditors might possibly have been jeopardized
by the issue of paramount lien certificates, the Federal District Court
of Delaware " granted authority to issue the certificates, but without
priority. We may discard at once the clear case of impracticability
of success, for no court will force the dissenting bondholder to
assune the risk of speculative enterprising on the part of the receiver."
However, where the speculative nature of the adventure
is not at issue, the courts hold conflicting opinions as to whether,
having issued the certificates, the holders thereof may enforce their
liens prior to the mortgagees. One view maintains that such payments
are preservative in nature, since they tend to the general benefit of
all parties concerned, including the objecting mortgagee, all of whose
interests would be impaired by forfeiture. The New Jersey Court,
in Lockport Felt Co. v. United Paper Co.,

7

adopted this line of

reasoning and upheld the issuance of certificates to pay a redemption
Hanna v. State Trust Co., supra note 4, at 9; Cox v. Snow, supra note 13.
Toole-Tietzen & Co. v. Colorado River Development Co., 38 F. (2d) 85o
(S. D. Cal. i93o).
" Spackman v. Orchard Co., 274 Fed. io7 (D. Del. 1921) (corporation solvent-no benefit to objecting lienholders, but possible jeopardy to their claims).
'"
Van Valkenburgh v. Ford, supra note to; see Cox v. Snow, supra note 13,
at 238; 273 Pac. at 937.
'

',

Supra note 4.
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installment and interest to the first mortgage bondholders in order
to prevent foreclosure. As opposed to the constitutional objection,
the analogy to the case of a franchised public utility is at once apparent. But the inapplicability of this analogy is emphasized by the
fact that the courts which adhere to the view of the New Jersey
court do so on the ground of the actual preservation effected, after
asserting that continuation of the business as such would be permissible only in the case of quasi-public corporations.' s Although
preservation of the property supplies the basis for jurisdiction in
either class of corporations, the above-mentioned distinctions recognized by the courts are doubtless sufficiently strong to carry the point.
However it is not-clear how the logical perfection of the rule accounts
for the factual objection that the business is in fact carried on by the
receiver.
The other view adopted by the courts also distinguishes the situation from that of quasi-public corporations, but its adherents prefer
to find that continuing the business is outside the scope of preservation purposes." Since, practically, objections to continuance only
arise where there is a probability of loss such that the objecting mortgagee is not willing to take a risk at the hands of a receiver which
the private entrepreneur could not vindicate, the doctrine of the
New Jersey Court would seem to fall within the constitutional objection to continuance. If the analogy to quasi-public corporations
might be drawn, the court's doctrine could be sustained in spite of
the unconstitutionality argument. However, even were the courts
holding to the New Jersey view not so stanchly opposed to drawing
that analogy, the result would still be open to the criticism that the
mortgagee s rights are subverted by an unwarranted resort to a doctrine akin to that of salvage as applied in admiralty law. 50 It may
also be argued that the rule creates an element of uncertainty in fixed
obligations with a consequent tendency to discourage investors from
accepting a form of security which is indispensable to the operation
of private corporations. Nevertheless, the Lockport Felt Company
Case has become the most widely cited case on this point, and there
"sTitle Insurance and T. Co. v. Calif. Development Co., supro note I2;
McDermott v. Pentress Gas Co., 82 W. Va. 230, 95 S. E. 841 (918) (to prevent lapsing of lease-the court expressed its disapproval of issuance for operating expenses) ; cf. Ball v. Improved Property Co., 247 Fed. 645 (C. C. A. 2d,
1917) (to prevent forfeiture of lease, the most valuable asset) ; Printing Co. v.
Hotel Co., ii8 Mo. App. 44, 93 S. W. 337 (i9o6). But see Say. Bank v. BallBearing Chain Co., supra note 3, at 710, 92 N. W. at 716 (long lease will not
warrant receiver in continuing speculative business).
" "For the court, by an order of this sort, to displace existing liens, would
certainly be very doubtful as to its propriety, if, indeed, it would not be an
entirely illegal act . . ," Newton v. Eagle Phoenix Mfg. Co., 76 Fed. 418
(N. D. Ga. 1896). But see the opinion by Learned Hand, J., in Ball v. Improved
Property Co., supra note 48.
U'See note (19o9) 22 HARV. L. REV. 373, 374.
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is little doubt that the courts will continue to recognize the prevention
of forfeiture as a necessary preservative purpose."
B. As to Conthuation to Increase Saleable Valve
The situation in which this question arises is factually identical
to the previous one except that the objections of the mortgagee are
met by the argument that continuation of the business presents a likelihood that the saleable value of the property will be increased. Here,
the Kentucky rule is illustrative of the general feelings entertained
by courts of equity in considering this question. In the Kentucky
case of Montgomery Coal Co. v. Allais,52 certificates were allowed
to come in prior to the mortgage lien, on disposition of the property
after sale, only to the extent of the increase in value produced by the
issue of certificates. Thus, the court's authority to grant the issue
was made to depend upon the success of the receiver's venture.
Doubtless, the result of such a rule cannot be criticized from the
viewpoint of the objecting mortgagee, since the court having gone
into business, it is not reasonable to allow the investors therein to
obtain a priority of claim to investors whose rights were fixed under
the previous, private administration of the business. Certainly,
the rule cannot be said to work a hardship upon those who have
prayed for continuance of the business, since (i) they cannot demand
benefits at the expense of prior lienholders 53 and (2) if the business
cannot be operated with sufficient expectation of success to encourage
investment without insurance of its return, then it may be argued
that clearly there is a case where it would be unwise for the court to
authorize continued operation. On the other hand, such a rule is
anomalous and must fail of practical operation. Since, the only
proper security available to certificate purchasers in the last analysis
is that created by the operations of the receiver, investors will not
be found willing to accept such security in a business that failed
under the usually more efficient private operation. A more unconscionable result is reached where the receiver grants priorities over
the prior vested obligations only to have his promise overruled by the
appellate courts. To permit this state of affairs is to discourage
the highly desirable market for certificates when their sale is sought
for the purpose of actual preservation. Manifestly, an investor cannot
be expected to recognize the difference between preservation and other
uses to which the receiver may apply his loan and he most certainly
will not assume the risk of the receiver's assurances being overruled.
McDermott v. Pentress Gas Co., supra note 48; See R. I. Hospital Trust
Co. v. Greene Corp., 5o R. I. 3o5, 146 Atl. 765 (1929) ("If the property is liable
to be lost by foreclosure of a mortgage, or is imperiled by failure to keep up
insurance . .

,"

there is no question of the propriety of issuing certificates for

these purposes).
'Supra

note 9.

' Hcoper v. Trust Co., supra note i.
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Hence, the issuance of certificates has been upheld, in some instances,
on the ground that the certificate holders had relied on the court to
4
confirm the act of its officer and protect them from loss at his hands.
But this liberal treatment has not been accorded to petitioners before
the majority of courts and the New York court, in the case of Raht
v. Attril," unyieldingly protected the rights of the bondholders as
against the purchasers of certificates.
However, aside from the Kentucky view, which does not appear
to have been adopted by any other court, there is a line of cases
which have actually allowed certificates to displace pre-existing liens
on the general ground that their issuance preserved the property by
increasing its saleable value. At the head of these is Karn v.Rorer
Iroan Comnpany,'8 in which the building of a bridge was held to be a
valid preservative purpose, since, without it, the iron ore in the
mines could not have been marketed and the property would have
been of no "commercial value." The construction of a small mining
railway running over the bridge was completed by the receiver and
the court seems to have lighted upon this railway factor as sufficient
grounds for drawing the analogy to the case of quasi-public corporationsY.1
Doubtless, much can be said for the practical force of the
analogy, but. again, an attempt to thus extend the rule in the case of
private corporations is met by opposition in the form of the universal
rule with its unwavering distinction between the two classes of corporations. It seems, therefore, that the court's previous "reason"
affords a more normal ground for the decision. In McDermott v.
Pentress Gas Co.,5s after the stereotypical reiteration of the rule that
only in the case of quasi-public corporations would continuance of the
business be a sufficient purpose for allowing displacement of prior
liens, the court upheld continuation for a long enough period to put
the property in a saleable condition. In the course of his discussion,
Judge Lynch expressed the opinion that the distinction between the
two classes of corporations as to the necessity for continued operation
is merely one of degree. This statement also is typical and adds
nothing of definitive value, especially in the light of the court's conclusion that the distinction must be maintained for the protection
of fixed obligations.

Whenever a tacit, practical analogy may be

drawn, in the judicial mind, to the case of a quasi-public corporation,
it seems that these apparent extensions of the rule will continue to
be upheld on the ground of preservation.
But where the same
economic necessity, that exists in quasi-public corporations, is not
' Kneeland v. Luce, 141 U. S. 491 (189) ; Dalliba v. Riggs, supra note 1;
see Montgomery Coal Co. v. Allais, supra note 9. But see cases supra note 8.
6Supra note I.
'Supra note 8.
SThe court quotes a passage from the opinion by Bradley, J., in W\rallace v.
Loomis, supra note ii, which case involved a railroad in the hands of a receiver.
" Supra note 48; cf. Toole-Tietzen & Co. v. Colorado Development Co.,
snpra note 45.

NOTES

present to motivate the court, such extension would not seem to be
warranted unless in the form of the Kentucky rule which in the
last analysis subverts the interests of no one.
C. As to Actual OperatingExpenses
To allow continuation of the business, as such in the case of a
private corporation-merely to produce profits-under the guise of
preserving its property is to render mere "lip-service" to the established rule. Consequently, decisions permitting such judicial enterprising are rare. However, in view of the general tendency among
the modern chancellors to devolve upon receivers the considerable
task of salvaging the whole ship from the wreck in order that all
claimants may be satisfied, a discussion of these extreme cases of
judicial discretion would seem to be in order. Of course, the fact
that consent or a judicial finding of estoppel will at once dismiss the
problem must not be ignored. A recent example of this type of case
is one decided by the Supreme Court of Rhode Island, 50 wherein
part of the loan to the receiver was used to purchase new machinery
to be used in the dyeing and bleaching business. Many of the cases
which purport to sustain actual operating activities on the part of
the receiver are thus reconcilable on the broad ground of estoppel. 60
However, the Rhode Island court on a former appeal of the same case,
held to the effect that if the continuation of the business was for the
benefit of the lienor, then to so continue the business must be an act of
preservation a's regards the lienor though he objects to continuance.'
Thereupon the court gives as examples, such businesses as involve the
operation of oil and mining property. As stated by a well-known
text-writer,02 ".

. Such properties on account of peculiar working

conditions are often surrounded with conditions and circumstances
which make their continued operation imperative as a means of
preservation." Here again it is the peculiar nature of the property
that gives rise to the necessity for continuing the business of the corporation-almost a perfect analogue to the quasi-public corporation
situation on the theoretical basis of the Barton v. Barbour 63 reasoning. It has been said 11 that the conflict which exists in these cases,
as to whether a necessity for operation in fact exists, is not real,
but arises from the fact that the status of the property in question
rendered the refusal to grant authority to continue the business a
proper one under the circumstances. A few cases have adopted this
' R. I. Hospital Trust Co. v. Greene Corp., supra note 13; see the former
opinion on the case, reported in 5o R. I. 305, 146 At. 765 (929).
oSee cases supra note 13.
R. I. Hospital Trust Co. v. Greene Corp., supra note 51.
"II TARDY'S S miTH, op. cit. supra note io,§ 558.
' Supra note 17.
1 II TARDY'S SmIsTH, op. cit. supra note 10, § 558.
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line of reasoning," while an overwhelming number of courts have
refused to allow the issuance on the sole ground of want of authority.66 In McDermott v. Pcntress,67 the West Virginia Court of Appeals, although stating the general rule that receiver's certificates
should not be used for the general purpose of operation, recognized
that the necessities of the situation required drilling operations to be
undertaken by the receiver in order to preserve the oil property. 8 It
would seem that the Barton v. Barbour theory should also be applicable to the case of an irrigation company, and a California decision,69 where the authorized receivership operations were extensive,
clearly points in .that direction. In no case does it seem that the
analogy to the necessities of preservation in quasi-public corporations
is stronger, yet the California court distinguished the case from that
of railroad receiverships and upheld the issuance as necessary for
preservation.7 1 In a state where irrigation has become fully as essential to the economic welfare as quasi-public corporations, it is surprising that the California Court preferred factual contradiction to
violation of the categorical integrity of the general rule. One other
situation is worthy of comment, i. e., where the lienholder objects to a
displacement without which his interest in the property would have
been utterly worthless. 7 1 Here, again we have an unusual case, for
doubtless the lienholder should have consented to the displacement
of his lien, if approached, since he could only be benefited thereby.
Theoretically, as to his rights, the continuation could be nothing if
not preservative.
Karn v. Rorer Iron Co., supra note 8; McDermott v. Pentress Gas Co.,
supra note 48 (Oil Co.) ; see Montgomery Coal Corp. v. Allais, SI(pra note 9;
Central Trust Co. v. Pittsburg R. Co., 52 Misc. Rep. 195, ioi N. Y. Supp. 837
(19o6) (mine).
'Farmer's Loan & T. Co. v. Grape Creek Coal Co., supra note i ; Fid. Ins.
T. Co. v. Roanoke Iron Co., supra note 2; Nowell v. International Trust Co.,
169 Fed. 497 (C. C. A 9th, igog) ; Dalliba v. Riggs, supra note I; for full citation of additional authorities, see note (1926) 4o A. L. R.. 244.
' Supra note 48.

' "The power granted to encumber by operating expenses and by the drilling
of additional wells, except to meet the imperative necessities of the situation, and
the appropriation of the income to meet these expenses, and, when this is exhausted, to displace the liens by receiver's certificates, cannot result otherwise
than detrimentally to the rights and interests of the secured creditors, if continued longer than reasonably necessary to obtain a fair market value for the
estate of the insolvent corporation." Ibid.
' Title Insurance and T. Co. v. Calif. Development Co., supra note 12. But
see Hanna v. State Trust Co., supra note 4.
' The court merely invoked its discretion in deciding this question, saying,
"It is sufficient to say, in answer, that our own reading of the record satisfies us
that there was ample evidence to justify the conclusion that all of the expenditures authorized by the court were required for the actual care and preservation
of the property committed to the receiver's custody." Ibid. at 231, 152 Pac.
at 566.
'Lunsky

v. The Criterion Construction Co., 151 Atl. 490 (N. J. i93o)

(receiver authorized to complete construction of apartment house in the stead
of defunct construction company) ; (1931)

31 CoL. L. RE'. 170.

NOTES

8o

Beyond the few isolated situations herein outlined, in which
continuation of the business may be most easily reconciled with the
idea of preservation, no courts have deemed it wise to venture. An
even balance of economic and legal principles must necessarily require
a curtailment of further extensions either tacitly, on the grounds of
preservation, or expressly by exception to, or inclusion within the
general rule. Such extensions would, (i) either inequitably enhance
the security of one group of investors at the expense of another, or
(2) have the sole and singular justification of having set the receiver
up in business by supplying an insured six per cent. investment to
certificate holders.
A.F.B.

